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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of the Austrian Regional Extended Bene!t Program (REBP)
on the labor market outcomes for elderly workers in Austria. The REBP extended entitlement
to regular unemployment bene!ts from 30 weeks to a maximum of 209 weeks for elderly indi-
viduals in certain regions. This policy change created a large-scale quasi-experimental situation
from which a lot can be learned about the impact of unemployment insurance rules on the
dynamics of employment, unemployment, and wages. We !nd that the REBP led to a tremen-
dous increase in unemployment which was due to both an increase in the in"ow to and the
out"ow from unemployment. The REBP also induced a strong increase in early retirement
and in many cases, in particular for steel workers, entering unemployment meant withdrawal
from the labor force. Finally, we show that there were also non-negligible eects of extended
bene!ts on the level and the distribution of wages.
JEL Classi!cation: C4, J64, J65
Keywords: quasi-experiments, maximum bene!t duration, unemployment in"ow, duration
of unemployment, early retirement, earnings, inequality.
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1 Introduction
In June 988, the Austrian government enacted, in January 992 reformed, and in August
993 abolished, the Regional Extended Bene!t Program (REBP). This program extended the
entitlement to regular unemployment bene!ts for elderly individuals in certain regions to a
maximum of four years. These successive policy changes over time together with the discrim-
ination by regions and by the age of the unemployed created a large-scale quasi-experimental
situation from which a lot can be learned about the impact of bene!t duration on labor market
outcomes. The aim of this paper is to study these eects with respect to various labor market
outcomes.
The REBP was enacted in response to the international steel crisis during the 980s that hit
the traditional iron and steel regions in Austria particularly hard. Thus the bene!t extension
was a policy response to the expectation of adverse labor market conditions. Dierences in the
observed labor market outcomes between the treated and non-treated individuals are therefore
a mixture between a causal impact of the bene!t extension on the labor market behavior of
individuals and !rms as well as the result of a negative shock on the labor market. The present
analysis will deal with this problem in an informal way. In a companion paper (Lalive and
Zweimu¨ller, 2000) we study in detail for the case of unemployment duration how the above
two eects can be separated.
The generosity of the European unemployment insurance systems is generally viewed as a
candidate explanation for the cross-Atlantic dierences in labor market performance. Hence,
a !rst aim of this paper is to document the impact of the REBP on employment and unem-
ployment levels.
We then discuss how the increase in unemployment can be split up into the unemployment
in!ow and the out!ow. Unemployment in"ow re"ects to a large extent the incentives of the
REBP on !rms’ employment decisions, unemployment out"ow represents the eects of REBP
on the search behavior of the workers. A possible impact of the unemployment insurance
system works not only via its direct eect on the out"ow from unemployment but may also
signi!cantly aect other dimensions of labor supply behavior. This paper therefore aims to
take a broader look at the problem by looking at nonemployment, which represents to a large
extent long-term sickness and early retirement. These latter states are of particular relevance
as the increase in the bene!t duration applied only to older workers and because the Austrian
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social security system handled access to disability and to early retirement bene!ts rather
generously. With respect to possible eects of the REBP the interesting question is whether
this tremendous bene!t extension was eectively a policy measure that led older workers to
withdraw completely from the labor market.1
The REBP may not only have created a substantial disincentive to the supply of labor but
may also have a potentially signi!cant eect on employment decisions of !rms. With seniority
rules characterizing the wage policies covering older workers, the REBP may have provided
an incentive for !rms to get rid of older high-wage workers. As the REBP constituted an
improvement in the workers’ outside option this may have made it easier for !rms to defect on
these long-term seniority contracts (Winter-Ebmer, 2002). Hence, it is interesting to see how
the REBP aected employment choices of the !rms.
Our data set comes from two sources. The !rst data source are the Austrian social security
records which contains detailed information on the workers’ employment and earnings history.
We use a 0 % sample of male employees in the Austrian private sector in the age group 40-59
and follows these individuals over the period 984 to 998. The second data set is the Austrian
unemployment register and covers the universe of males entering unemployment between 986
and 995 in the age group 45-54. This in"ow is then observed until 998.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the theoretical and empirical
literature on the impact of unemployment insurance systems on the labor market. In section 3
we provide some information on the Austrian labor market, survey the Austrian unemployment
insurance system, and give a detailed description of the Austrian REBP. Section 4 describes
the data in more detail and gives an overview of the empirical approach we pursue. In section
5 we !rst present detailed evidence on eects of the REBP on the stocks of employment and
unemployment and then discuss brie"y the impact of the REBP on structural change in the
concerned regions. Section 6 focuses on the dynamics of unemployment. We look at the in- and
out"ow from unemployment and consider not only transition rates to regular jobs, but put also
particular emphasis on entry into early retirement. How the REBP aected the life-cycle labor
force participation of various cohorts is analyzed in section 7. Section 8 studies the impact on
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the earnings structure. Section 9 draws the conclusions.
2 Theory and Previous Empirical Evidence
Most of the previous literature that addresses the impact of the unemployment insurance
system on the labor market has focused on its impact on the duration of unemployment. Im-
portant theoretical work in this area is based on job search theory (Mortensen, 977, Burdett,
979, Van den Berg, 990). In these models, job seekers determine the reservation wage and
the job search intensity optimally given the current labor market state and rational expec-
tations concerning the future payo to the relevant labor market states. According to this
theory increasing generosity of unemployment insurance will lengthen the expected duration
of unemployment because this raises the value of remaining unemployed relative to the value
of taking up a regular job.
The empirical literature on the eects of unemployment insurance on unemployment has
largely con!rmed this proposition. Katz and Meyer (990) estimate an increase in unemploy-
ment duration of .6 to .20 weeks per additional week of potential bene!t duration which is
close to the !ndings of other US studies (Mott and Nicholson, 982, and Mott, 985).
Ham and Rea (987) reach a somewhat larger result for Canada. Hunt (995) and Bratberg
and Vaage (2000) !nd a similar eect, respectively, for Germany and for Norway, whereas
Winter-Ebmer (998) !nds a somewhat smaller impact for Austria.2
The theoretical literature that deals with the eects of the unemployment insurance system
on the unemployment in!ow can be distinguished between studies that concentrate on layos
and studies that analyze voluntary quit behavior. The literature on layos has focused on
implicit contracts in the face of product demand "uctuations. Imperfect experience rating
leads those !rms to lay o workers who will experience a less than proportionate increase
in the unemployment insurance bill (Feldstein, 976). Firms will choose to lay o workers
who are covered by unemployment insurance rather than those who are not covered (Baily,
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977; Jurajda, 2000).# Workers who are entitled to unemployment insurance will have higher
reservation wages than other workers and will therefore be less likely to !nd a suitable job with
a dierent employer.
The theoretical prediction of unemployment insurance on quit decisions depends on the
unemployment insurance system. In the US, voluntary quitters are not entitled to unemploy-
ment bene!ts, hence higher generosity (e.g. due to longer bene!ts) should decrease the quit
rate. The reason is that by staying another period there is a chance to be laid o and qualify
for bene!ts. In Austria, quitters are entitled to unemployment bene!ts but there is a waiting
time of four weeks (see Section 3). The theoretical prediction is then less clear. More generous
unemployment bene!ts in such a system tend to increase the likelihood of a quit as the value of
unemployment increases. This has to be weighed against the negative eect mentioned above.
The net eect essentially depends on the length of the waiting period.
The empirical literature on unemployment in"ow has focused mainly on the US experience
and is to a large extent concerned with the eects of imperfect experience rating. These
eects are found to be large (Topel, 983, 984, 985; Card and Levine, 994). Topel (985)
uses a measure of the proportion of unemployment bene!ts subsidized by the government and
shows that this measure aects unemployment in"ow strongly. Andersen and Meyer (994)
!nd that, on the one hand, the bene!t level strongly aects in"ow into unemployment; on
the other hand, the eect of entitlement to unemployment bene!ts on unemployment in"ow
is not signi!cantly dierent from zero. In contrast, Jurajda (200) !nds that entitlement to
unemployment insurance strongly aects layos whereas neither the bene!t level nor potential
duration of bene!ts are signi!cant (conditional on entitlement).4 Anderson and Meyer (997)
show that the probability of unemployment take-up strongly increases in the expected level of
unemployment bene!ts.
Baker and Rea (998) and Christo!des and McKenna (996) analyze the eect of bene!t
eligibility on the hazard of ending an employment spell in Canada. They !nd that there is a
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positive spike in the week when individuals become entitled to unemployment bene!ts. Nickell
(982) analyzes time-series of "ows into unemployment in Britain and !nds no evidence of
the eect of the level of unemployment bene!ts. Winter-Ebmer (2002) analyzes the Austrian
REBP and !nds that extended bene!ts increased the yearly in"ow into unemployment by at
least 3 percentage points per year.
The impact of unemployment insurance on labor market dynamics and the level of wages
is studied in matching models (Pissarides, 2000). The prediction is that unemployment insur-
ance strengthens the bargaining position of workers thus leading to higher wages. However,
wages do not increase one-for-one with unemployment bene!ts because higher wage pressure
reduces pro!ts leading to lower job creation (with !xed job productivity). This result holds
with endogenous job destruction (Mortensen and Pissarides, 994) and match heterogeneity
(Marimon and Zilibotti, 999). The bulk of the matching literature assumes risk neutrality of
the workers. Acemoglu and Shimer (999) analyze the optimality of unemployment insurance
in a model with risk-averse workers and investment on the part of !rms in capital-intensive
high-wage jobs. They show that the optimal unemployment insurance is characterized by
high wages because generous unemployment insurance raises the incentives for !rms to create
capital-intensive jobs. While the theoretical literature on this issue is extensive (for a survey
see Mortensen and Pissarides, 999), the empirical literature on the eects of unemployment
insurance on wages is sparse. Acemoglu (997) !nds a large eect of unemployment insurance
on the capital intensity of jobs across states in the US.5 The literature concerned with struc-
tural estimation of job search models established the positive eect of unemployment insurance
on the reservation wage (see Wolpin, 995, for a survey).
There are two previous studies analyzing the impact of the Austrian REBP. Winter-Ebmer
(998) who looks at the initial impact of the bene!t extension on unemployment duration
at the period of introduction of the REBP. He !nds that the bene!t extension decreased
the job hazard rate by somewhat less than 20 %. The second paper, Winter-Ebmer (2002),
studies the impact on the in"ow into unemployment and !nds substantial REBP-eects also
on unemployment entry. The conclusion is that the increase in unemployment entry was most
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likely due to layos of high-tenured and older workers rather than voluntary quits.
The present paper goes beyond this study in at least !ve important respects. First, we
consider not only the impact of the bene!t extension after its introduction, but also the impact
of the reform and of the abolishment of the REBP. Secondly, we use a more informative and
much larger data set. This allows us to focus on a narrow age group and avoid a possible bias
resulting from a misspeci!cation of the eect of age. Thirdly, we put particular emphasis not
only on the transitions between employment and unemployment, but we also look the problem
of early retirement (including long-term sickness and disability pensions). This is of particular
importance as access to early retirement was generous during the period under consideration.
Fourthly, we put particular emphasis on a distinction between steel workers and employees in
other industries. This allows us to highlight in a rather informal way the relative importance
of labor market conditions (which were very severe for the former group) and causal eects of
bene!t entitlement rules (which may be a more dominant factor for labor market behavior for
workers in other industries). Finally, we also look at the question whether wage formation was
aected by the change in the bene!t system. As the program aected a large fraction of the
male working population such eects could well show up. We will look both at median wages
and the wage spread between high- and low wage workers.
3 The Austrian Unemployment Insurance System
Austria has been a country with a low unemployment rate and a low average duration of
unemployment, as measured by European standards. In 994, the overall unemployment rate
was 6.8 % and the percentage long-term unemployed (! 2 months) was less than 20 %, which
is much closer to the US !gures than to the European average.
Table 
While Austria has been doing relatively well in terms of unemployment outcomes, the
unemployment situation of workers above age 50 has deteriorated dramatically over the period
988 to 993. The unemployment rate of the age group 50-59 was 5. % in 988, which was
even below the 988 overall unemployment rate of 5.3 %, but it doubled until 993 when it
increased above 0 % (see Table ). Figure  shows that there was a steady increase in the
ratio of the unemployment rate of the age group 50-59, relative to the age group 40-49, a trend
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which did not stop until 993, when the law was abolished. Figure  also shows that this
increase in the relative unemployment rate was almost exactly matched by an increase in the
relative incidence of long-term unemployment. The former ratio increased from . in 988
to .67 in 998 whereas the latter increased from .37 in 988 to 2.09 in 993.&
Figure 
The Austrian unemployment insurance system distinguishes two types of unemployment
compensation: (i) regular unemployment bene!ts (”Arbeitslosengeld”, UB) and (ii) unemploy-
ment assistance (”Notstandshilfe”, UA). Until August 989 UB-bene!t duration was 30 weeks
provided that the unemployed had paid unemployment insurance contributions for at least 56
weeks within the last 5 years prior to the current spell. These rules were changed in August
989 and UB-duration became dependent not only on previous experience but also on age.
Bene!t duration for the age group 40-49 was increased to 39 weeks if the job seeker has been
employed 32 weeks of employment within the last 0 years prior to the current spell. For the
age group 50 and older, UB-duration was increased to 52 weeks if the unemployed has been
employed for at least 468 weeks within the last 5 years.
Voluntary quitters and workers discharged for misconduct can claim bene!ts not until a
waiting period of 4 weeks has passed. Both UB and UA recipients are expected to search
actively for a new job which should be within the scope of the claimant’s quali!cations, at
least during the !rst months of the unemployment spell. Non-compliance with the eligibility
rules is subject to bene!t sanctions that can lead to withdrawal bene!ts for up to 4 weeks.
Once unemployment bene!ts have run out, the unemployed individual can apply for unem-
ployment assistance. Austrian citizens and foreign workers with a long-term work-permit are
eligible to UA which is granted for successive periods of at most 39 weeks, after which entitle-
ment can be renewed. There is no limit for the number of such renewals, so the UA-duration
is basically in!nite.
Compared to other European countries, the replacement ratio (UB relative to gross monthly
earnings) is rather low and depends on previous earnings. In 990 the replacement ratio was
40.4 % for the median income earner; 48.2 % for a low-wage worker who earned half the median;
6^. 1TFF1 &2" '$#8&-*. *' -.,-4-,(#)0 -. &2" (.";6)*O;".& 0&*8< J2* J"$" (.";6)*O", '*$ #& )"#0& # O"#$ J#0
1F=G _ #;*.% -. &2" #%" %$*(6 SCEST1 #., ]]=T _ -. &2" #%" %$*(6 QCEQT= ^. 1TTY1 &2" 8*$$"06*.,-.% !%($"0
J"$" 1`=F _ #., Y`=] _=
8
and 29.6 % for a high-wage worker earning twice the median income. On top of this, family
allowances are paid. UB are not taxed and not means-tested. UA is means tested and depends
on the income and wealth situation of other family members and close relatives. UA payments
are lower than UB and amount to at most 92 % of UB. In 990, UA was on average 78 % of
UB as a result of the means test. In 990, the majority of the unemployed (59 %) received UB
and 26 % received UA.
3.1 The Regional Extended Bene!t Program (REBP)
In June 988, the Austrian government enacted a law that extended UB-entitlement to 209
weeks for a speci!c subgroup. This group consisted of individuals considered to suer most
heavily from the adverse labor market consequences of the international steel crisis. The crisis
hit certain regions of the Austrian economy, in particular regions where state-owned !rms
were located. Moreover, the measure intended to help also employees in other industries that
were indirectly aected by the crisis and the restructuring process that was initiated in many
nationalized !rms thereafter (Hesoun, 988).
An unemployed worker became eligible to 209 weeks of UB if he or she satis!ed each of the
following criteria:
(i) age 50 or older,
(ii) a continuous work history (780 employment weeks during the last 25 years prior to the
current unemployment spell),
(iii) location of residence in one of 28 selected labor market districts since at least 6 months
prior to the claim,
(iv) new unemployment spell after June 998 or spell in progress in June 988.
The REBP was in eect until December 99 when a reform of these rules took place which
came into eect in January 992. This 99-reform left all claims in progress unaected. Only
new claims were subject to the new rules.
The 99-reform included two important changes. First, the reform abolished the bene!t
extension in 6 of the original 28 regions. The program ended in December 99 in these
districts because the respective labor markets were considered to have improved signi!cantly
so that the long UB-entitlement was no longer justi!ed.
The second important change with the 99-reform was a tightening of the eligibility cri-
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teria to extended bene!ts: new bene!ciaries had to be not only residents, but also previously
employed in one of the (now only 22) speci!ed regions. The location of the previous employer
as an additional eligibility requirement has a quantitatively important impact on the poten-
tial number of bene!ciaries because a substantial number of residents in REBP-regions were
working in a labor market district not covered by the bene!t extension.
It is important to emphasize that all individuals in the sample that will be analyzed in
Section 6 are potentially eligible to unemployment assistance transfers. We cannot observe the
level of UA since information on the income and wealth situation of family members and close
relatives is not available in our data. A possible impact of extended bene!ts is therefore due
to the more generous UB relative to UA; to reductions in UA due to the means test; and to
the negative connotation of a ’welfare recipient’ associated with the UA-status.
4 Data and Method
Our data set comes from two sources. The !rst data source are the Austrian social security
records which contains detailed information on the workers’ employment and earnings history.
Our particular data set contains a 0 % sample of male employees in the Austrian private
sector, covers all workers in the age group 40-59, and follows these individuals over the period
984 to 998. There is a period of approximately 4 /2 years (January 984 to June 988)
before the REBP was introduced; a period of about 5 years (June 988 to July 993) when the
bene!t extension was in eect, and a further period of 5 /2 years (August 993 to December
998) after this law was abolished. The second data source is the Austrian unemployment
register. We consider the universe of male unemployment entrants in Austria in the age group
45-54 over the period 986 to 995 and follow these individuals up to end of the year 998.
The main focus of our analysis will be on a comparison between the age group 45-49 and
50-54. As we can assume that workers in this age group are close substitutes our estimates
cannot be strongly aected by a direct eect of age. This is of particular importance since age
is an eligibility criterion for the REBP. On the other hand, these two groups may be ’too close’
substitutes in the sense that e.g. a strong reduction in employment for the age group 50-54
may feed back to the labor demand for age group 45-49 via general equilibrium eects. It
will therefore be instructive to also consider age groups that are further away from the critical
eligibility age 50. Moreover, a broader age window also allows us to look at life cycle eects and
0
look at possible persistence eects of the REBP on labor market outcomes after the program
has been abolished.
We present the results of our analysis in four steps. We !rst concentrate on the levels
of employment, unemployment, and non-employment (predominantly some sort of early re-
tirement); as one important motivation for the introduction of the REBP was to facilitate
structural change (downsizing of the steel industry that came in severe troubles with the in-
ternational steel crises in the mid 980s), we will also look to which extent the structure of
employment has change in REBP-regions relative to other regions.
This analysis clearly shows that unemployment levels are dramatically higher in those
regions where the REBP was imposed. Higher levels of unemployment, of course, can either
be the result of higher unemployment risk given the average duration of an unemployment
spell; or a higher duration, given the risk of unemployment; or both. The second step of our
analysis is therefore to look at the dynamics of unemployment and to see to which extent this
higher unemployment levels have increased not only the average duration of an unemployment
spell but also the in"ow rate.
Job search theory holds that the variable that should be directly aected from an extension
of unemployment bene!ts is the expected duration of job search. So the most interesting
question is how the out"ow from unemployment has been dierent between unemployment
entrants that were eligible to the REBP relative to those who were not. An important aspect
in this evaluation is the question whether a longer duration of unemployment for REBP-eligible
workers is due to a causal impact of extended bene!ts, and to which extent this is simply the
results of worse labor market conditions for these individuals, the latter fact being the reason
why the REBP was introduced in the !rst place. This means the REBP was an endogenous
policy response due to the expectation of worse labor market conditions in those regions. A
companion paper (Lalive and Zweimu¨ller 2000) analyzes this question in detail. Here we will
give some informal evidence about the possible size of the bias that arises when this endogenous
policy adoption is not accounted for.
It is very likely that the REBP has had not only an important impact on the duration of
unemployment but also on the risk of unemployment. We will therefore look at the unemploy-
ment in"ow. The aim of the REBP was not only to insure older workers against worse job
chance in case they suer an unemployment spell, but also to facilitate downsizing of struc-

turally weak (in particular, iron and steel) industries that were concentrated in those regions.
This meant that the typical workers did face a higher risk of unemployment. It is therefore
interesting to see whether the in"ow into unemployment of older workers in these regions is
signi!cantly concentrated in those periods and regions where the REBP was in eect. The
idea is that, by improving the workers’ outside options, the REBP decreased the !ring costs
of !rms and allowed !rms to defect on long-term seniority contracts.
The third dimension we are interested in are life-cycle aspects. How did the introduction
of the REBP aect labor supply behavior of various cohorts? Since we are concerned with
a program that helps older workers, the interesting question is how this program aected
the transition process of these workers from labor force participation to retirement. We will
contrast the experience of those workers who were never entitled to the REBP to cohorts that
were partly and/or entirely eligible to the program.
The !nal variable which is analyzed in this study and which may have been potentially
aected by the REBP is the structure of wages. We look at older workers’ wages at the
3rd, 5th, and 7th decile of the wage distribution and look at the dierences between workers
eligible to the REBP relative to the wages of those groups that were never eligible to that
program. Also with respect to wages it is interesting to contrast wages of currently employed
individuals (= the employment stock) and the relative wages of destroyed and new created
jobs (= employment "ows).
5 The Impact of the REBP on the Levels of Employment and
Unemployment
Figures 2 and 3 show how, for the age groups that were aected by REBP, the employment rate
and the unemployment rate developed over the period 984 to 998. Note that the denomina-
tor of the ratio shown in these Figures includes the whole population in that age group so the
numbers in Figure 2 are therefore comparable to the employment population ratio, whereas
the numbers in Figure 3 are the unemployment population ratio and not comparable to the un-
employment rate, as it usually measured (unemployed relative to employed plus unemployed).
To avoid confusion we will refer to these measures as, respectively, the employment ratio and
the unemployment ratio.
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Figure 2
Figure 2 compares the employment ratios for elderly workers in REBP-regions to those in
non-eligible regions, separately for workers in the age group 50-54 and for workers aged 55-59.
Consider !rst the age group 50-54. For this group there is almost no regional dierence in
employment performance before the REBP starts: about 90 percent of all workers observed
in our sample are employed in 984. In 988, the period when the program started, the two
indicators start to diverge and the employment ratio of workers in REBP-regions falls behind
the one of the non-eligible group. The dierence increases and reaches its maximum in 993,
the year when the REBP was abolished. The regional dierence in employment ratios in that
period is very large and amounts to almost 0 percentage points. After the abolishment of the
program, the employment ratio in REBP-regions increases again and reaches the level of the
non-treated regions in 998. Note also the overall downward trend in the employment ratio
over the whole period shown in the upper panel of Figure 2: starting from a level of 90 % in
the mid 980s, the employment ratio has come down to 80 % by the end of the 990s.
The employment situation is dierent for the age group 55-59. For these older workers
there is a signi!cant regional dierence in the employment ratio already before the REBP
was introduced; moreover, in the treated regions this ratio decreases strongly until 988 when
the REBP-start, stays at a very low level during the REBP-period and increases slightly
thereafter. In contrast, the employment ratio follows a smooth downward trend in the control
regions. Note that in the age group 55-59 the overall downward trend over the period under
consideration is even stronger than for the age group 50-54. In the mid 980s the employment
ratio in control regions was almost 80 %, and by the end of the 990s this ratio has come down
to less than 60 %.
Figure 3
Figure 3 shows the corresponding picture for the unemployment ratios. For both age groups
we see the same picture. Slightly lower unemployment ratios in the REBP-regions before the
program starts; an increase during the REBP-period, and a decrease of the ratio after the
program had been abolished. By the end of the 990s the unemployment ratio in REBP-
regions has fallen below the one of control regions for both age groups. Note also that the
dierences in unemployment ratios are tremendous: for the age group 50-54, this dierence
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becomes as large as 7 percentage points (in year 992); for the age group 55-59 the dierence
becomes even higher ( percentage points in 993). (Note that dierences in conventionally
measured unemployment rates would be even higher).
Two further points that emerge from Figures 2 and 3 are worth mentioning. The !rst
point concerns the long-term eects of the REBP on employment and unemployment. In both
Figures we see signi!cant dierences between treated and non-treated regions even after the
program has been abolished. This is not surprising given the fact that unemployment entrants
in REBP-regions in 993 (when the program ends) are still entitled to draw bene!ts until
the year 997. So we should actually see dierences in our labor market indicators until that
period. Interestingly, exactly this picture shows up in Figures  and 2 (the only exception
being the employment ratio for the age group 55-59).
The second interesting point refers to nonemployment (=individuals neither employed nor
unemployed). While for the age group 50-54 there are no dramatic regional dierences in the
fraction of individuals that have completely withdrawn from the labor force throughout the
considered period, these dierences become large for the age group 55-59. Figure 3 shows that,
in this age group, there are very strong regional dierences in the fraction of individuals that
have withdrawn from the labor market. But the highest dierence already occurred at the
date when the REBP was introduced and starts to decrease thereafter. Figure 3 suggests that
a sizeable fraction of those who otherwise would have been nonemployed, became eligible to
extended bene!ts. This increases unemployment and reduces nonemployment. Nevertheless,
it is obvious from Figure 4 that nonemployment remains much higher in REBP-regions also
during and after the program.
Figure 4
Figures 2 to 4 all refer to workers older than 50. A comparison of the regional dierence in
employment and unemployment ratios for workers under 50 is informative. If we would see the
same picture as in Figures 2 and 3 also for workers under 50, the obvious interpretation would
be that adverse labor market shocks, speci!c to the time-period 988-993 and to the REBP-
regions - but not the increase in bene!t entitlement in these regions - account for the empirical
evidence. Only if there is a signi!cant dierence in labor market performance between workers
above and below age 50 we can causally link the large regional dierences shown in Figures 2
and 3 to the increase in bene!t duration provided by the REBP.
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Figure 5
Figure 5 clearly shows that, for workers below age 50, the regional dierences between
treated and non-treated regions are small in comparison to the regional dierences for workers
aged 50 and older. In fact, (un)employment performance of workers below 50 is even slightly
better in REBP-regions, both for the age group 40-44 and the age group 45-49. Dierences in
non-employment ratios are negligible Figure 4 therefore clearly suggests that, in treated regions,
workers above age 50 do not do worse because of worse labor market conditions in these regions
during the program. There appears to be causal link between the bene!t extension and the
employment performance of the concerned individuals.
In sum, a very clear picture emerges: for eligible workers, both unemployment and employ-
ment ratios are rather equal between the two regions before the program starts; during the
treatment period the employment ratio and the unemployment ratio strongly increase, reach a
turning point around the year 993, and decrease thereafter. The REBP-eect is long-lasting:
employment and unemployment levels in treated regions remain signi!cantly higher even after
993 and reach the corresponding levels of the non-treated regions not until the year 998. No
such pattern is observed for non-eligible workers. We are therefore lead to conclude that there
is a causal link from the entitlement to long bene!ts to employment performance.
As mentioned above the REBP was introduced in reaction to the international steel crises
in the mid 980s. Regions covered by the program had typically a high percentage of workers
employment in the iron and steel industry. The REBP did not only help older workers in case
of unemployment but was also an indirect subsidy to employers as it allowed !rms to get rid of
older employees in overstaed plants more easily. It is interesting to see to which extent this
has changed the structure of employment in these regions relative to the rest of the economy.
Table 2
Table 2 shows the fraction of steel workers in total employment at the period when the
REBP started (988), immediately before the reform of the program (99), and when it was
abolished (993). Among the age group above 55 the percentage of steel workers is already low,
meaning that early retirement is prevalent for workers in these industries and it was so already
before the program started. For the age group 50-54, however, the reduction is dramatic.
During the REBP-period, there is a continuous fall in employment in the steel industry, the
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fraction of workers aged 50-54 falls from almost 20 % in 988 to less than 2 % in 993. We
see also a reduction in steel-industry employment shares for younger workers, but the fall for
these groups is only half as large. It is clear from Table 2 that there is no such trend in the
non-treated regions. In these regions the employment share of iron and steel industries stays
at around 4 %, with no dramatic dierence across age groups and time.
6 Unemployment Dynamics and the REBP
The higher level of unemployment during the REBP-period may either be due to a longer
average duration of unemployment for eligible workers; or it may be due to an increase in
the unemployment in"ow. As mentioned above, it is very likely that the REBP did not only
lead to longer unemployment spells, but also to an increased in"ow into unemployment, since
the REBP provided a chance for !rms to !re older workers at comparably low cost. We now
proceed by looking at these two channels separately.
6.1 The REBP and the Increase in Unemployment Duration
Table 3 gives information about the unemployment spells in treated and non-treated regions.
In total, 385,463 unemployment spells were started by males in the age group 45 to 54 during
the period 986 to 995. The upper panel shows the survivor rates for these spells, separately
for workers eligible to the REBP and for non-eligible workers. The message of Table 3 is
clear: unemployment spells suered by individuals eligible to the REBP last longer. For these
individuals, more than 30 % of all spells are still in progress after one year, as opposed to only
9 % for individuals that are not eligible.' On average, a treated spell lasts about 0 months
and is about 2.5 times as long as a non-treated one. Note that this number refers to completed
durations. The fraction of treated spells that is still in progress by the end of our observation
period (December 998) amounts to almost 8 %. Treated spells were started before August
993, which means that the elapsed duration of a treated spell that is censored is at least 5
/2 years.
7X*&" &2#& &2"0" .(;7"$0 #$" ,$#J. '$*; #. !"!#$ $#&2"$ &2#. # 0&*8< 0#;6)" (&* J2-82 *"8#) .(;7"$0
*. &2" 6"$8".&#%" )*.%E&"$; (.";6)*O;".& (0(#))O $"'"$)= D)"#$)O1 &2" '$#8&-*. *' )*.%E&"$; (.";6)*O", #& #.
#$7-&$#$O 6*-.& *' &-;" -0 )#$%"$ &2#. 1C _ ,(" &* &2" J"))E<.*J. *4"$0#;6)-.% *' )*.%E&"$; 06"))0 -. 0&*8<E
0#;6)"0=
6
Table 3
Both for treated and non-treated spells, by far the most important exit status is employ-
ment. In total, three out of four unemployment spells end in a regular job, the remaining spells
are followed by a spell of non-employment, predominantly long-term sickness( or some form of
early retirement. The dierences between spells eligible to the REBP and those that are not
is large: among the former, only 55.5 % among the eligible individuals return to a job; and
almost 25 % of eligible spells (but only 0 % of the non-eligible ones) end either in long-term
sickness or early retirement. A sizeable fraction of individuals exit to non-employment for rea-
sons that cannot be observed in the data. There are no important dierences between treated
and non-treated spells along this dimension.
An open question is whether the extreme dierences by eligibility to the REBP represents
a causal relationship that goes from the extension in bene!ts to the duration of unemployment
or whether this is a statistical artifact simply arising from adverse (regional and age-speci!c)
labor market shocks in the REBP-regions. In order to investigate this question informally,
we show two pieces of evidence.9 The !rst is a separate analysis of the experience for steel
and non-steel workers (Table 4). Adverse labor market conditions should predominantly be
observed in the former group. Secondly, we report an analysis that distinguishes between
REBP-regions that had labor market conditions which were comparable to the control regions
and those which had particularly strong labor market problems (Table 5). A comparison of
non-eligible spells with those treated spells in the former regions should entirely re"ect a causal
impact of the REBP.10
Table 4
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Table 4 shows that steel workers are longer unemployed and have a lower probability to
return to employment than non-steel workers. This is shown by all comparisons presented in
Table 5, but among treated spells these dierences are strongest. Only one third of REBP-
eligible steel workers that enter an unemployment spell again !nd a regular job. Note that
this number is not "awed by right-censoring. Right-censored, treated spells last at least 5 /2
years, the likelihood that these workers will !nd a regular job is certainly close to zero. In
sum, the evidence for steel workers shows that the worse unemployment experience for eligible
workers must, to a non-negligible degree, be due to a bad labor market.
To see more closely possible causal eects of the bene!t extension on unemployment dura-
tions, it is instructive to compare the experience of unemployed individuals that face similar
labor market conditions. The REBP provides an interesting natural experiment in this respect.
The 99 reform of the program, that came into eect in January 992, excluded several dis-
tricts that were eligible during the period 988-99. The reason was that labor market condi-
tions were found to have signi!cantly improved, so REBP-eligibility was no longer justi!ed. In
fact, it can be argued (see Lalive and Zweimu¨ller, 2000) that it turned out ex post that labor
market conditions in these regions were rather similar to control regions already during the
pre-reform REBP-period. A comparison of these regions to control regions should therefore
not be biased by dierences in regional labor market performance. Hence, observed dierences
between treated and non-treated spells are most likely the consequence of dierences in bene!t
duration rules.
Table 5
Table 5 distinguishes unemployment duration outcomes of treated individuals in the set of
regions that was excluded in the reform of January 992 (treated, TR), treated individuals
in the remaining regions (treated, TR2), and job seekers who were never eligible to extended
bene!ts. Comparing unemployment duration outcomes of the job seekers in TR with the non-
treated individuals gives an upper bound of the eect of extended bene!ts on unemployment
duration.11 Clearly, extended bene!ts increase mean completed duration by about 7 weeks.
Moreover, extended bene!ts do not appear to reduce labor force participation as indicated by
the small dierence in exits to a regular job. A comparison of treated individuals in TR to
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job seekers in TR2 allows assessing the size of the policy endogeneity bias, the extent to which
the eects of extended bene!ts may be overestimated due to adverse labor market shocks in
the set of TR2 regions. The eect of extended bene!ts on mean completed duration is about
29 weeks - more than four times the aforementioned estimate. Moreover, in the set of TR2
regions, REBP appears to decrease labor force participation tremendously. The percentage of
individuals who is ever observed to start a regular job is 25 percentage points lower for treated
workers in TR2 than for non-treated workers.
6.2 Did the REBP Increase the Unemployment Risk of Older Workers?
The generous entitlement to regular unemployment bene!ts provided by the REBP represent
a decrease in !ring costs for older workers. Did this result in a higher risk of unemployment
for the eligible group? Figure 6 gives an answer to this question. The numbers in Figure 6 are
the quarterly in"ow rate, from May 0th to August 0th of each year,12 and refer to the age
groups 50-54 (upper panel) and 55-59 (lower panel).
Figure 6
For both age groups there are no particular regional dierences in the in"ow rates from
employment to unemployment in the mid 980s. For the age group 50-54 this picture changes
in 988 when the REBP was introduced; and already somewhat earlier for the age group 55-
59. Moreover, the observed regional dierences are large: on average, the in"ow rates of the
treated group are about twice as large as the in"ow rates of non-eligible workers.
Moreover, there is an interesting pattern as far as the timing of these in!ows is concerned.
For both age groups the in"ow rate for workers eligible to the REBP reaches a peak in the years
99 and in 993: a time pattern that is not visible for the non-entitled workers. The years
99 and 993 are, respectively, the periods immediately before the reform and the abolishment
of the REBP. The reason why the in"ow rates are higher during these periods can easily be
rationalized by an ’end-game’ situation between !rms and workers: !rms who have to downsize
their work force for structural reasons will !nd it easier to convince worker representatives to
lay o workers in a period when the individual costs of unemployment are still comparably low.
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The expectation of a strong increase in these costs due to a shorter duration of unemployment
bene!ts facilitates an agreement with high layos now and low layos later (when the extended
bene!ts program has run out). The same pattern shows up not only for the year 99 and the
year 993 but also for both age groups 50-54 and 55-59.
Figure 7 shows the regional dierences in unemployment in"ow rates for the younger age
groups 40-44 and 45-49. It is evident from this !gure that these dierences are not particularly
high and there are no time patterns comparable to those observed for the workers above
age 50. However, it is interesting to see that, with only a few exceptions, in"ow rates for
younger workers are somewhat smaller in the treated regions over the entire period. This
is consistent with the proposition that the REBP has improved the employment prospects
of younger workers in treated regions via general equilibrium eects: The REBP increased
the demand for workers below 50 relative to workers above 50 in these regions. Where a
employment reductions became necessary, and this has taken the form of !ring the older
workers but keeping the somewhat younger, closely substitutable employees.
Figure 7
The REBP was a reaction to a shock that did not only hit a particular region, but also
one that hit a particular sector: the steel industry. It is therefore interesting to see whether
the unemployment in"ow rates were dierent by sectors. Figure 8 shows that there is very
strong dierence between the unemployment risk of steel-workers (lower panel) and employees
in other industries (upper panel). While also in the non-steel industry in"ow rates for older
workers in REBP-regions are higher, the regional dierence is comparably small. For the steel
industry, the dierences are tremendous: in 993 the quarterly in"ow rate amounts to as much
as 5 % for workers aged 50-54 and about 5 % for workers aged 55-59. Interestingly, the above
mentioned time pattern - peaks in the in"ow rate in the years 99 and 993 - are observed
for all groups in Figure 8.
Figure 8
Figure 8 suggests an interesting point. REBP-regions were regions that were hit particularly
hard by the international steel crises in the 980s. The REBP transmitted this sectoral/regional
shock into an age-speci!c shock. Firms who had to decrease their employment levels !red
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workers that had access to generous transfer payment from the government. What we see for
steel workers in Figure 8 can therefore not be interpreted as a causal impact of bene!t duration
on the unemployment in"ow rate, but rather as the consequence of a very bad labor market
situation. The impact of the REBP was to concentrate the worse labor market outcomes on the
older steel workers. It is much more plausible to interpret the eect for employees in the non-
steel sectors as an upper bound for a causal impact of bene"t duration on the unemployment
in"ow. In REBP-regions these sectors were in a shape similar to the rest of the economy but
may have been hit by stronger indirect eects than the rest of the economy.
7 REBP-E!ects from a Life-Cycle Perspective
Was the REBP a program that mainly facilitated a smooth transition from work to retirement
for elderly workers? In order to look at this question, we take a more long-term perspective
and look at the dynamics of labor force participation of certain cohorts. Figure 9 shows, over
the period 984 to 998, the unemployment ratio, the employment ratio, and the labor force
participation ratio for the cohorts born, respectively, in 938, 94, and 944. The graphs are
drawn separately for treated and non-treated regions. The cohort 938 (age 50 in 988) was
eligible to long bene!ts throughout the REBP-period, the cohort 944 was never eligible (age
50 in 994), whereas the cohort 94 (age 50 in 99) was eligible only in the years 99 to
993. (A dotted line in Figure 9 means that the cohort is below age 50).
Figure 9
First of all, Figure 9 shows that unemployment ratio for the cohort 938 increases during
the REBP-period, stays high also after the REBP has been abolished and falls to lower levels
not until the period 998. The labor force participation ratio starts to decrease strongly after
the age 54 (in 993). Only 76 % of individuals of the cohort 938 are still at work at that age. In
comparison, the corresponding fraction in the control regions amounts to 85 %. The dierence
is similar for the cohort 94. At age 54 (year 995, when the program was abolished, but the
long-term eects of the REBP are still at work), in treated regions only 72 % of the observed
population aged 54 are still employed, whereas the corresponding number for the non-treated
regions amounts to 82 %.
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No such dierence is given for the cohort 944. This cohort was never eligible to the REBP
and neither the labor force participation ratio, the employment ratio, nor the unemployment
ratio show any particular dierence between treated and non-treated regions. Figure 9 therefore
strongly supports the proposition that a main eect of the REBP was to open the door to
retirement for workers that were dismissed from their jobs, even if they were still relatively
young.
8 Did the REBP A!ect the Wage Structure?
The !nal question concerns the level and distribution of wages and how this was changed by
the REBP. One reason for the introduction of the REBP was to reduce the !ring costs for
overstaed !rms and allow these employers to lay o older workers that were expensive and
were paid above their productivity. Did this actually happen in practice?
Table 6 gives a tentative answer to this question. We compare the previous earnings of
unemployment entrants entitled to the REBP to the previous earnings of non-eligible entrants.
We perform a dierence-in-dierence-in-dierence (DiDiD) analysis that makes use of the fact
that there are three criteria that determine eligibility to the extended bene!t program: age,
region, and time. From Table 6 we see that previous wages of unemployment entrants aged
50-54 were rather similar between treated and control regions before the program came into
eect. The median of the log daily wage distribution was 6.566 in treated and 6.603 in non-
treated regions. This amounts to a wage-dierential of -.036. In the period during which the
program was in force, previous wages of unemployment entrants were higher than before, the
regional wage dierential for the age group 50-54 amounted to +.05. And this dierential
returned to -.029 which is very close to the pre-program situation.
Table 6
Did something similar happen in the age group 45-49? The answer is no. Throughout all
three periods, unemployment entrants in treated regions had earned somewhat less than their
colleagues in the control regions and the wage dierential was surprisingly stable throughout
the whole period. The dierential amounted to -.024, -.03, and -.036, respectively before,
during, and after the REBP. The DiDiD estimate for the wage gap between eligible and non-
eligible workers was +.49 if one compares the pre-program with the during-program situation.
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And the gap was -.29 if one compares the during-program with the post-program situation.
This eect seems to be robust and estimated with a rather low standard error. The DiDiD-
estimator therefore suggests that unemployment entrants eligible to the REBP were older
high-wage workers.
Table 7
How did the REBP aect other dimensions of the wage structure? The !rst row in Table
7 shows the DiDiD-estimate for unemployment entrants when not only the median but also
the spread (7th/3rd decile) of the log daily wage distribution is analyzed. The result is that,
just like for the median, the spread in the distribution of previous wages is larger for eligible
entrants and that this eect is of a comparable size as the eect on median log wages. The !nal
row of Table 7 addresses the question of whether extended bene!ts aected the distribution
of accepted wages. Here we do not see any signi!cant dierence in accepted wages between
treated and non-treated unemployed individuals. Hence, a longer duration of bene!ts appears
not lead to increasing choosiness of the workers. Similarly, we do not see a clear picture on
the spread of the distribution of accepted wages.
The !nal piece of evidence which we present here concerns the median log daily wage
of all the employed individuals. Here we compare the distribution of log daily wages of the
entire male labor force. The REBP seems to have lowered wages for the employed individuals
in these regions by between  and 3 percentage points. The eect is originally small in the
period during which the REBP was in eect, and becomes larger in the post-program period,
and the eect is between  and 3 percentage points. The long-lasting eect of the REBP on
wages may well re"ect the wage pressure resulting from the long-lasting eects of the REBP
on unemployment levels (see Figure 3). While REBP had a negative eect on the wage level, it
increased wage inequality. The 7th/3rd decile log wage dierential increase both in the period
when the program was introduced and in the post-REBP-period.
9 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the impact of bene!t duration on various dimensions of the labor
market. The basis of our empirical analysis was the quasi-experimental situation that was
created by the introduction of the Austrian regional extended bene!t program, which granted
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four years of regular unemployment bene!ts to workers above age 50 in certain regions. Our
empirical analysis is based on two unique and very large data sets that cover, respectively, 0
% of all male employees aged 40-59 over the period 984-998, and the universe of all male
unemployment entrants in Austria aged 45-54 over the period 986 to 995.
A !rst main message of our analysis is that the REBP has a profound impact on the labor
markets of treated regions. This means that the dominant focus in the literature, namely the
impact of the unemployment insurance system on the duration of unemployment is too narrow.
Important eects may also come from transitions in and out of the labor force, in the case of
older workers, the important transitions are exits from employment/unemployment to some
form of early retirement.
The second main message from our analysis is that a drastic increase in bene!t entitlement
rules may have quantitatively very strong eects. The consequence of the drastic increase in
bene!t duration was a dramatic increase in the levels of unemployment. The unemployment
level in the treated regions was highest in the year when the program was abolished when more
than 2 % of the population aged 50-59 were unemployed.
The increase in unemployment was not only due to an increase in the duration, but also due
to an increase in the unemployment in"ow. The increase in the risk to become unemployed was
particularly dramatic for steel workers, and less so for the remaining sectors of the economy.
For all sectors, however, we see an interesting time pattern in the in"ow. Immediately before
the program ends there is a very strong increase in the in"ow. This ’last minute’ eect is also
visible immediately before the 99 reform.
The third main message of our analysis is that bene!t extension for older workers signi!-
cantly aect the life-cycle pattern of labor force participation. The long bene!t duration lead
to a situation where, in many cases, the start of an unemployment spell was the beginning
of retirement. In other words, the bene!t extension was a hidden form of early retirement.
This was especially so for steel workers: one out of three unemployment spells suered by steel
workers ended in a new job. For the remaining spells of steel workers retirement had already
begun.
The !nal message of our analysis is that the wage eects of extended bene!t programs
should not be neglected. For the Austrian REBP we !nd that predominantly high-wage jobs
were destroyed as a consequence of the REBP. Moreover, the high unemployment rates that
24
the bene!t extension created may have aected the process of wage formation. We !nd that
REBP-regions experienced lower wage increases than the rest of the economy, and that the
spread in the wage distribution has increased.
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Figure 3. The effect of REBP on unemployment (% of population)
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Figure 4. Regional difference in the nonemployment ratio, ages 50-59
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Figure 6. The effect of REBP on unemployment inflow 
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Figure 7. Regional difference in unemployment inflow rate, ages 40-49
unemployment  inflow
 age 40-44  age 45-49
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
-.01
0
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
Figure 8. Regional difference in unemployment inflow rate
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Figure 9. A life-cycle perspective
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Table 1: Unemployment in Austria, 1988 and 1993
1988 1993
Overall unemployment rate 5.3 6.8
Age 40 – 49 4.7 6.0
Age 50 – 54 5.1 9.9
Age 55 – 59 5.4 11.1
Source:   Arbeitsmarktservice Austria.
Table 2: Steel workers (% of employment)
Before During After Total
1988 1991 1994
A. Treated regions
Age 55 – 59 6.90 7.82 6.84 7.19
Age 50 – 54 19.72 15.33 11.78 15.39
Age 45 – 49 18.51 16.42 14.57 16.64
Age 40 – 44 17.02 15.59 13.79 15.49
B. Control regions
Age 55 – 59 3.89 3.66 3.90 3.82
Age 50 – 54 4.52 4.19 4.00 4.20
Age 45 – 49 4.14 4.04 4.13 4.10
Age 40 – 44 4.40 4.78 4.51 4.57
All regions 7.41 6.87 6.20 6.83
Notes: May 10 of respective year.
Source: Own calculation based on Austrian social security data.
Table 3: Unemployment Spell Characteristics
[ N ] [ % ] [ N ] [ % ] [ N ] [ % ]
Duration
>= 3 months 79241 39.53 12251 51.72 140116 38.73
>= 6 months 21684 18.98 9162 38.68 63998 17.69
>= 9 months 10998 13.35 8236 34.77 43232 11.95
>= 12 months 16790 10.50 7497 31.65 32958 9.11
>= 24 months 23671 6.14 5493 23.19 18161 5.02
Mean completed duration (days) 139.51 315.08 128.68
Exit status
Employment 291117 75.52 12885 54.40 278232 76.91
Long term sickness 29272 7.59 3391 14.32 25881 7.15
Retirement 14860 3.86 3010 12.71 11850 3.28
Olf 40302 10.46 2535 10.70 37767 10.44
Censored 9912 2.57 1866 7.88 8046 2.22
Observations 385463 100.00 23687 100.00 361776 100.00
Notes: Sample covers all unemployment spells started between 1986 and 1995 of male
individuals aged 45 to 54.
Source: Own calculations based on Austrian social security data.
     All spells       Treated spells       Non-treated spells
Table 4: Unemployment Spell Characteristics, Steel Workers vs Non-steel Workers
All spells Treated spells Non-treated spells
Mean completed duration (days)
Steel workers 234.07 504.49 172.68
Non-steel workers 128.46 220.52 124.30
Exit to employment (% of total)
Steel workers 57.57 30.63 64.37
Non-steel workers 77.72 67.62 78.19
Observations
Steel workers 42010 8468 33542
Non-steel workers 343453 15219 328234
Notes: Sample covers all unemployment spells started between 1986 and 1995 of male 
individuals aged 45 to 54.
Source: Own calculations based on Austrian social security data.
Table 5: Unemployment Spell Characteristics, Policy Endogeneity Bias
TR1
Treated
TR2
Treated Non-treated
Mean completed duration (days) 178.45 332.13 128.68
Exit to employment (% of total) 75.22 51.96 76.91
Observations 2482 21205 361776
Notes: Sample covers all unemployment spells started between 1986 and 1995 of male  
individuals aged 45 to 54. TR1 (TR2) refers to regions entitled to REBP 
from 1988-1991 (1988-1993).
Source: Own calculations based on Austrian social security data.
 
Table 6: REBP and the Wages of the Unemployment Entrants
Before
policy
During
policy
After
policy
Time 
Difference
Before-
During
Time 
Difference
During-After
A. Workers aged 50-54
Treated regions 6.566 6.839 6.821 0.273 -0.018
821 1611 1019
Control regions 6.603 6.734 6.849 0.131 0.115
2725 3108 3373
Regional difference -0.036 0.105 -0.029 0.141 -0.134
B. Workers aged 45-49
Treated regions 6.598 6.709 6.759 0.111 0.050
1094 1047 1089
Control regions 6.622 6.740 6.795 0.118 0.054
3159 3569 3798
Regional difference -0.024 -0.031 -0.036 -0.007 -0.005
Difference-in-difference-in-difference estimate (DiDiD) 0.149 -0.129
(0.018) (0.020)
Notes:      Standard error in parenthesis. Log of daily real wage in AS.
Source:    Own calculations, based on Austrian social security data.
Location / year
Table 7: The Effect of REBP on Wages, DiDiD Estimates
During policy After policy During policy After policy
Unemployment entrants 0.149 -0.129 0.153 -0.107
(0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.028)
Exits from unemployment 0.029 -0.021 0.033 -0.061
(0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.032)
Employed -0.011 -0.026 0.027 0.017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Notes: Standard error in parentheses; difference-in-difference-in-difference estimates.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian social security data.
Change in Difference 
7th decile-3rd decileChange in Median
